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Abstract.To date it is unknown why mathematics is working in physics. Only the 
fact that it does work is well known. Physics is thus viewed as consisting of two bodies of 
knowledge – experience and mathematics which are only interlocked, but not organically 
united. This article searches for such an organic union. In more detail: experimental physics is 
ultimately based on elementary particles, which Thomistic philosophy of nature can account 
for by hylomorphism. Therefore, experimental ehysics and Thomistic philosophy of nature 
share comparable views of their common object. On the other hand, theoretical physics 
applies mathematical formulae to natural processes. Thanks to their success in describing 
such processes, these formulae are called ‘laws of nature’. But these laws do not refer to any 
particular individual material thing the behaviour of which they are supposed to describe, 
and the reason for their success is unknown. Contemporary theoretical Physics and Thomistic 
philosophy of nature are far away from each other.
In order to find the organic union referred above, this paper proposes a basic idea 
for obtaining physico-mathematical theories from experience. For this purpose, it analyses 
experiments and particularly measurements as intermediators between the material world 
and physico-mathematical theories. It turns out that the object of theoretical physics is 
experienced reality, but only after two severe modifications. The above-mentioned programme 
starts from the unmodified experience and has as its philosophical core the thomistic version 
of hylomorphism and the principle ‘agere sequitur esse’. It is innovative and can be expected 
to yield more insight into the relationship between physics and mathematics than the division 
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of speculative sciences in metaphysics, mathematics and others proposed by Aquinas in his 
Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate.
Keywords: Physics, mathematisation, double cut-off, foundation, hylomorphism, agere-
sequitur-esse.
Introduction
To date physicists do not know why mathematics is working in physics. Only 
the fact that it does work is well known. Working means that physicists more or less 
successfully ‘apply’ mathematical expressions to natural processes, wherefore these 
expressions are called ‘laws of nature’. The application in turn always involves some 
experimental activity. This is why the knowledge of the fact that mathematics does 
work in physics is a sort of practical knowledge. It seems that experiments cannot be 
based on or reduced to thought experiments. Thence it seems that the knowledge of why 
mathematics is working in physics cannot be reduced to a purely theoretical knowledge.
Additionally, the said application is always hypothetical and thus not necessarily 
definitive. It does not match with the expectation that for each type of natural processes 
there should essentially be only one physico-mathematical theory. Therefore, in addition 
to the hypothetico-deductive character of mathematics per se, the hypothetical character 
of the “application” of mathematics to natural processes contributes strongly to the 
epistemological climate in physics.
The removal of this lack of self-understanding of physics would certainly be 
beneficial for the depth of physical knowledge. But where should such an amendment 
of selfunderstanding start from1? Perhaps one could learn something from the attempt of 
solving a similar problem, namely the ʽBohr-Einstein debate’. It began in 1927 between 
Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein and dealt with the question of the completeness of quantum 
theory, which then was revolutionary. In 1935, both Einstein (with his coworkers) and 
Bohr published an article under the same title: “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description 
of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”2. Einstein and his coworkers answered 
‘no’; Bohr’s answer was ‘yes’.
For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the arguments proposed in that debate are 
partly mathematical (clothed into thought experiments). This, however, cannot possibly 
1 The present article takes into account only arguments taken from contemporary physics. A brief account of 
the essential changes from medieval philosophy of nature to physics in the modern sense, during the scientific 
revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, is offered in Larenz, R. Does Physics need a second scientific 
revolution? International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, Vol. 4, 2013. Online www.sinowesternstudies.
com.
2 Einstein, A.; Podolsky, B.; Rosen, N. Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be 
Considered Complete? Physical Review. 1935, 47: 777-780; and Bohr, N. Can Quantum-Mechanical 
Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? Physical Review. 1935, 48: 696-702.
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be expected to yield an understanding of the relationship of a physico-mathematical 
theory to material things, because the problem would have only been shifted but not 
solved. That is to say the explanation of the relationship of mathematics to material 
things must necessarily begin with only one of both sides. If one takes the stance that 
material things are, in some sense, prior to mathematical expressions referred to them, 
the relationship of mathematics to material things has to be a foundation of those 
particular mathematical objects and structures based on these very same material things.
This is also the reason why the concept of interpretation of a theory should be 
absolutely avoided. Only a foundation of a theory can be admitted. Such a foundation 
must necessarily depart from ordinary experience, and this is why the Aristotelian 
philosophy of nature and consequently also the Thomistic one are good tools for 
attempting to answer the question of why and how does mathematics relate to material 
things.
It must be admitted, though, that neither the Aristotelian nor the Thomistic 
philosophy of nature has never been seriously brought into contact with the distinctive 
elements of modern physical science, namely with experimentation in general and 
measurement in particular, and with the difference between experiment and theory. 
Therefore, the explanatory power of these philosophies has never really been tested.
This article tries to do that by proposing the basic idea for a foundation of the 
relationship of certain mathematical objects and structures to nature. It can be hoped, 
therefore, that a real problem of physics offers a way of updating Thomistic philosophy 
of nature. In fact, physics might be the science in which the symbiosis between science 
and philosophy of nature can be established more easily.
The way towards this goal consists of two parts: first, a further specification of 
the problem already identified (sections II, III and IV). Second, the first steps of the 
solution to that problem (sections V, VI and VII). They will not be a mere application of 
traditional Thomistic philosophy of nature, but rather an innovative confrontation of its 
core principles with experimentation.
1. a Systematic defect in the de facto Existing mathematical 
Physics (i): the tendency towards total mathematisation
In order to show the relevance of the problem mentioned above, we present 
quotations from four renowned physicists. No commentary is needed, despite different 
historical contexts and philosophical backgrounds. Likewise it is less important for our 
purpose that the two first quotations concern theoretical physics in general, meanwhile 
the other two quotations refer only to quantum theory. All these quotations point clearly 
towards the same basic problem and have never been seriously contradicted. Therefore, 
they can be considered to represent the majority of physicists.
First, Einstein (1950): physico-mathematical concepts have nothing to do with experience, 
but the more with the human inventive genius. Theoretical concepts are absolutely 
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arbitrary and free inventions of the human mind3. “The very fact that the totality of our 
sense experiences is such that by means of thinking (…) it can be put in order, this fact 
is one which leaves us in awe, but which we never shall understand. … The fact that it is 
comprehensible is a miracle. ”4
Second, Eugene P. Wigner (1960): “The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of 
mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither 
understand nor deserve. ”5
Third, Richard P. Feynman (1967): “I think, it is safe to say, that no one understands 
quantum mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you possibly can avoid it, “But how 
can it be like that?” because you will go “down the drain” into a blind alley from which 
nobody has yet escaped. Nobody can know how it can be like that”6.
Fourth Roger Penrose (1986): “I should begin by expressing my general attitude to present 
day quantum theory, by which I mean standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The 
theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against 
it. First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with 
every experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of 
astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing that can be said against it is 
that it makes absolutely no sense!”7
All these views are radically different from the naïve idea of Galileo Galilei that 
nature is a book written in mathematical letters8. 350 years later, we have the famous 
passage from the introduction to the “Principles of Mechanics” by Heinrich Hertz (1894). 
Leaving aside the context of history of science (mechanical determinism, formulation 
of mechanics without the term ‘force’, introduction of the concept of ‘system’), the 
relationship between theory and (perceived) material reality is expressed in the following 
lines, which owe much to Kant’s epistemology:
3 Cf. e.g. Einstein’s ‘epistemological creed’ in his Autobiographical Notes in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) Albert 
Einstein - Philosopher and Scientist. La Salle (Illinois, USA): Open Court, 1970, p. 5
4 Einstein, A. Physics and Reality. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.: Journal of The Franklin Institute, 1936, 
221,3: p. 349-382, quotation p. 351.
5 Wigner, E. P. The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Communications in 
Pure and Applied Mathematics, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960, vol. 13, No.1, last paragraph. 
Also accessible on-line, for instance, at www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html. 
Wigner is a major figure in the development of quantum theory during the 30’s, 40’s and 50’s of the 20th 
century.
6 Feynman, R.P., The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, p. 129. Feynman is a 
major figure in the development of quantum theory during the 40’s, 50’s and 60’s of the 20th century.
7 Penrose, R. Gravity and State Vector Reduction, in: R.Penrose and C. J. Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts 
in Space and Time; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 129. Penrose is a major figure in the development of 
mathematical tools in quantum and relativity theory during the 70’s and 80’s of the 20th century.
8 Galileo uses this metaphor: “La filosofia è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continuamente ci sta 
dinanzi agli occhi (io dico l’universo), ma non si può intendere se prima non si impara a intendere la lingua e 
conoscere i caratteri nei quali è scritto. Egli è scritto in lingua matematica, e i caratteri sono trianguli, cerchi 
ed altre figure geometriche, senza i quali mezzi è impossibile intenderne umanamente parola; senza questi 
è un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberinto.” Galilei, G., Il Saggiatore. Opere, Edizione Nazionale, 
Firenze: Barbera, vol. VI, 1929-1936, p.333.
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“The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious knowledge 
of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we may arrange 
our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. As a basis for the solution of this 
problem we always make use of our knowledge of events which have already occurred, 
obtained by chance observation or by prearranged experiment. In endeavouring thus to draw 
inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt the following process. We form 
for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is 
such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the 
necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured. In order that this requirement may 
be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience 
teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied, and hence that such a conformity does in 
fact exist. [...] The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of things. With the 
things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely, in satisfying 
the above mentioned requirement. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be 
in conformity with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do 
not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in 
conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental respect.
The images which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity 
by the requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the 
consequents. Various images of the same objects are possible, and these images may 
differ in various respects.”9
It can fairly been said that modern physics is penetrated by mathematical structures 
and rationality, and quite successfully so. At the same time, physics is very poor in 
picturing the richness of reality as perceived by ordinary experience. Abstract concepts 
dominate, whereas all that belongs to the individuality of things and unrepeatability of 
events, is left to the activity of the single experimenter. But this activity is not represented 
by a body of conceptual knowledge within physics. Again, this is a way of saying that 
physicists lack knowledge of the reasons why certain mathematical objects relate to 
material things in the way they do, and as successfully as they do.
This lack of self-understanding of physics is a serious defect. Yet the success of 
mathematics in physics is a powerful factor that motivates physicists to drive physics 
ahead on the path of mathematisation. Specifically, mathematics is not just a tool 
used in physical science, the content of which is essentially non-mathematical. Rather 
mathematics is increasingly considered to be the source of ideas in physics, as the 
following text shows:
“Although Mathematics and Physics have grown apart in this century, Physics has continued 
to stimulate mathematical research. Partially because of this, the influence of Physics on 
Mathematics is well understood. However, the contributions of Mathematics to Physics are 
not as well understood. It is a common fallacy to suppose that Mathematics is important for 
Physics only because it is a useful tool for making computations. Actually, Mathematics plays 
a more subtle role which in the long run is more important. When a successful mathematical 
9 Hertz, H. The Principles of Mechanics, Presented in a New Form. London: Macmillan 1899, Introduction. 
Reprint New York: Dover Publications 1956; 2nd edition 2003.
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model is created for a physical phenomenon, that is, a model which can be used for accurate 
computations and predictions, the mathematical structure of the model itself provides a new 
way of thinking about the phenomenon. Put slightly differently, when a model is successful 
it is natural to think of the physical quantities in terms of the mathematical objects which 
represent them and to interpret similar or secondary phenomena in terms of the same model. 
Because of this, an investigation of the internal mathematical structure of the model can 
alter and enlarge our understanding of the physical phenomenon. Of course, the outstanding 
example of this is Newtonian mechanics which provided such a clear and coherent picture 
of celestial motions that it was used to interpret practically all physical phenomena. The 
model itself became central to an understanding of the physical world and it was difficult to 
give it up in the late nineteenth century, even in the face of contradictory evidence. A more 
modern example of this influence of Mathematics on Physics is the use of group theory to 
classify elementary particles.”10
The next step would be that mathematics becomes the leading, even the exclusive 
factor in shaping physics. One way of attempting this is the so-called (quantum) theory 
of measurement. It is not necessary to go into details in order to get the basic idea: 
while measurements always have been considered as a bridge between nature and 
mathematics, the idea of Theory of measurement transforms the bridge into something 
exclusively mathematical. This spirit has been expressed as follows:
“We shall hope to have established a systematic description of the quantum mechanical 
measurement process together with a concise formulation of the measurement problem. In 
our view the generalized mathematical and conceptual framework of quantum mechanics 
referred to above allows for the first time for a proper formulation of many aspects of the 
measurement problem within this theory, thereby opening up new options for its solution. 
Thus it has become evident that these questions, which were sometimes considered to 
belong to the realm of philosophical contemplation, have assumed the status of well-defined 
and tractable physical problems.”11
This would lead to a total absorption of physics into mathematics. Eventually, 
only physical names of mathematical objects would remind one of a relationship of 
mathematical objects with material reality. Nevertheless, the concept of theory of 
measurement retains the basic idea of measurement as a confrontation of two material 
things, because it tries to incorporate measurements into a physico-mathematical 
theory, not to eliminate or simply overlook them. Even though the distinction between 
mathematics and reality apparently vanishes and thus the predominance of mathematics 
is at its highest, the form of the physico-mathematical theory as a theory of measurement 
acknowledges the theory-shaping power of real measurements. This form is not 
demanded by mathematical reasons, but rather it must be considered as an experiential 
reality logically previous to the theory.
10 Reed, M.; Simon, B. Methods of Modern Mathematical Physics, vol. I. New York, San Francisco, London: 
Academic Press, 1972, p. ix.
11 Busch, P.; Lahti, P.J.; Mittelstaedt, P. The Quantum Theory of Measurement. Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York: Springer-Verlag, 1996 (2nd edition), p. IX. Italics by authors. As far as I know, this book is the first 
monograph at all on quantum theory of the measurement process, after decades of journal articles only.
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Whatever the particular mathematical features of a theory of measurement might 
be, the latter departs – in practice - from already existing physico-mathematical theories 
in order to obtain – guided by the idea of ‘mathematising the bridge’ – supposedly more 
complete physico-mathematical theories. The existing physico-mathematical theories 
are thus considered incomplete. Theories of measurement, then, cannot eliminate that 
incompleteness, because they continue being dependent on the previous physico-
mathematical theories.
String theories can be seen as another sort of mathematisation of physics. They 
came about for formal mathematical rather than physical reasons. In comparison to all 
previous physico-mathematical theories, the degree of speculation in string theories is 
generally considered to be much higher12. Thence they are not taken into account in the 
following.
2. a Systematic defect in the de facto Existing mathematical 
Physics (ii): mental deformation of experienced reality
After this short account of the relationship between mathematics and material 
reality from the point of view of theoretical physics, it is appropriate to have a certain 
picture from the point of view of experimental physics. Essential for an experiment is 
the interaction of an experimental object and an experimental apparatus or device. An 
important type of experiments is given by measurements – an interaction between a 
measuring object and a measuring instrument. Their results are always real numbers 
together with some dimension in conventional units. The key word for what is done 
with the observational data produced by an experiment is ‘mental deformation’. It is 
practiced throughout physics, consists of two phases and is referred to in what follows 
as ‘double cut-off’.
The deformation occurs in all experiments, but it is most easily explained by means 
of measurement. Without loss of generality, we may even restrict ourselves to length 
measurements, which are familiar to everyone.
The first cut-off consists in cutting measurements off from their global environment 
by introducing the following tripartition:
(i) no interaction before the measurement,
(ii)  interaction during the measurement, at the end of which the result is read off, 
and
(iii) no interaction after the measurement.
Step (iii) of this first phase of the double cut-off makes possible what is called 
a result of measurement. It is hardly possible to experimentally prove the existence 
of such an end of a measurement process. In fact, how would it be possible to prove 
experimentally – i.e. by interactions - that there is an interaction free domain? Step 
12 There exists, however, some mild criticism concerning the “overmathematisation” of physics, mainly with 
respect to string theories. See, for instance, Smolin, L. The Trouble with Physics. Houghton-Mifflin, 2006.
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(iii) seems to be a postulate by which the concept of result makes sense, and which is 
considered justified because of its practical success.
One could ask, whether it is possible at all to avoid such a mental deformation 
of perceived reality. Would not the dropping of (i)-(iii) cause the end of experimental 
physics with all its success, because it would be the elimination of results of experiments? 
Is it not more realistic and reasonable to mentally isolate the measurements as indicated 
in (i)-(iii) and to be content with successful approximations?
The second cut-off is even more radical than the first one. It consists in attributing 
the result read off from the measuring apparatus unilaterally to the measuring object. 
More precisely, the measured value is attributed only to the object, while the device 
contributes only to the dimensioned unit.
This attribution is inappropriate, because the different functions ‘object’ and 
‘apparatus’ have no foundation in nature. (Note that the asymmetry is not eliminated by 
attributing both functions to each side, because their correlation would continue.) They 
are rather brought about by the scientific interest of the experimenter and frequently 
also by purely practical reasons. The different treatment of object and apparatus in the 
case of measurement occurs similarly in any other experiment: instead of attributing the 
result – once produced by the first phase of the double cut-off equally to both sides, it is 
attributed unilaterally to the object only. Although seemingly harmless and reasonable, 
the second phase of the double cut-off is an extraordinarily radical mental deformation: 
it eliminates a symmetry. The resulting asymmetry cannot be viewed otherwise than as 
one of the most radical systematic deviations from reality that has ever happened in 
physics.
The two phases of the double cut-off form part of a whole: the first phase of the 
double cut-off (first cut-off) is the end of the measurement-interaction and thus makes 
possible results at a given moment. The second phase is the unilateral attribution of the 
result to the object. The experimental device is said to contribute only to the abstract 
dimensioned unit. Both phases together make possible, or at least are a decisive step 
towards, the total simulation of experiments and in particular measurements within a 
physico-mathematical theory (cf. section II). In other words, the double cut-off opens 
the door towards a complete mathematisation of physics.
In addition to the mentally operated deformation of experienced reality, the 
elimination of the aforementioned symmetry makes it impossible to answer important 
questions: how is it possible at all to obtain information about one material thing by 
means of another material thing? On what grounds is it possible at all to measure, i.e. 
to compare material things? This basic feature of every measurement could be called 
commensurability and has been lost in the second phase of the double cut-off.
Again, as in the case of the first cut-off one could ask whether it is possible at all 
to avoid such a mental deformation of perceived reality. Would not the dropping of the 
second phase make physics with all its success just impossible? Isn’t it more realistic 
and reasonable to perform a mental deformation of experienced material reality by 
attaching mathematical objects to individual objects, and so to obtain all sorts of 
practical advantages in the form of predictions and thus technology?
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In both cases, the answer is the same: It is neither proven nor even plausible that 
mathematics is linked to the material world in the way indicated by contemporary 
physics. On the other hand, it is also unknown which beneficial consequences would 
follow the double cut-off’s dropping. Only one consequence is clear. Renouncing the 
double cut-off from the outset would require a completely new elaboration of all physical 
knowledge. One would have to refrain from using the known physico-mathematical 
theories. Instead, one would have to start exclusively from experience.
Here is another corollary: The double cut-off has led to what is known as ‘Classical 
Physics’. Therefore, it is not correct to say that classical theoretical physics corresponds 
to ordinary experience while quantum theory does not. Classical theoretical physics 
definitely does not correspond to ordinary experience. Its success is as astounding as is 
the success of quantum theory.
3. A Systematic Defect in the de facto Existing Mathematical  
Physics (iii): two concepts related to the double cut-off
In this section we briefly present two concepts as instances of the profound impact 
of the double cut-off on physics in general. At the same time, they highlight the deep 
discrepancy of physico-mathematical theories with experienced material reality.
First, the concept of (absolute or relative) precision of a mathematical law 
of nature. It is often said that a material object follows a given law of nature with 
more or less precision. Absolute precision means that the law and the corresponding 
measurement(s) match perfectly. Relative precision means that theoretical calculation 
and the corresponding measurement match more or less. This way of speaking refers to 
the comparison of two numerical values, one of which is calculated from the physico-
mathematical law of nature, while the other is the result of the measurement(s) attached 
to the object. But the mere use of the result of a measurement requires the first phase of 
the double cut-off, so that the concept of precision of a law of nature cannot be separated 
from that first phase.
But once the result is obtained, it is difficult to resist performing the second phase, 
too. Abstracting from the experimental device entails focusing on the experimental 
object as if the experiment had never been made. But history cannot be simply forgotten, 
and that is why experiments are generally considered as a perturbation of the situation 
of the experimental object before the experiment. The three following quotations show 
how deeply this idea is (still) rooted in the thinking of most physicists. Even though due 
to their age these formulations have much of a deterministic view of nature, they still 
sound quite familiar:
“Truly, our accustomed description of nature and in particular the idea that processes 
in nature follow strict laws are based upon the assumption that it is possible to 
observe phenomena without exercising a notable influence on them. To attribute a 
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certain effect to a certain cause makes sense only if we can observe effect and cause 
without intervening at the same time in the process perturbing it.”13
“By means of the intervention necessary for the experiment we destroy certain 
connections that are characteristic for the microscopic world.”14
Similarly, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen formulate: “Any serious consideration of a 
physical theory must take into account the distinction between the objective reality, 
which is independent of any theory, and the physical concepts with which the theory 
operates. ... Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the 
physical theory. .... If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with 
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then 
there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. ”15
Clearly, the two actions of abstracting from the experimental device and, at the 
same time, calling its influence on the experimental object a perturbation are at odds. 
The distinction between ‘unperturbed’ or ‘proper’ and ‘perturbed’ reflects collecting 
information about the ‘unperturbed’ object by means of experimental ‘perturbations’. 
In other words, the first phase of the double cut-off creates a new concept of ‘the 
unperturbed (proper)’, although at the price of necessarily co-creating the concept of 
‘perturbation’.
Yet, it should not be overlooked that it is only from the perspective of macroscopic 
experience that the ‘perturbation’ takes place during the experimental interaction 
(which is limited to a ‘macroscopic time’). Equally from the perspective of macroscopic 
experience, the ‘proper’ is considered to exist only before the experimental interaction. 
Thence, only from the perspective of macroscopic experience, ‘real-time’ information 
is excluded. This remark might provide an additional motive to look critically at the 
double cut-off.
The alternative ‘Physics with or without the double cut-off’ separates two ways of 
thinking which cannot be reconciled with each other. It is impossible to pass gradually 
from one way to the other. Therefore, a real elimination of the double cut-off can only 
be achieved by not introducing it at all. Not introducing the first phase of the double cut-
off makes the distinction between ‘unperturbed’ and ‘perturbed’ inexistent. There is no 
such thing as perturbation. Everything is proper. Then, in the absence of the first phase 
of the double cut-off, the second phase can no longer take place.
The radicality of this alternative provokes a question similar to those raised in section 
III: is such a procedure reasonable or even possible now after having introduced the 
double cut-off centuries ago? Undoubtedly, the possibility always exists. As to whether 
13 Heisenberg, W. Physikalische Prinzipien der Quantentheorie (written 1929/30). Mannheim: 
Bibliographisches Institut, 1958, IV.3. (Translation and italics are mine.)
14 Heisenberg, W. Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften. Stuttgart: S. Hirzel-Verlag, 1959 
(9th edition), p. 103. (Translation and italics are mine.)
15 Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., Rosen, N., Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be 
Considered Complete? Physical Review. 1935, 47: p. 777-780, quotation p. 777. Italics by the authors.
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or not the building up of a new physics without double cut-off is esteemed reasonable, 
depends on how much is held in esteem the unity and thorough intelligibility of physics. 
And precisely this is lacking, for physics consists of two bodies of knowledge, which are 
only interlocked, but not really organically united (cf. section II).
An internal reform of physics headed at uniting harmonically both bodies of 
knowledge faces two requirements: first, it must give an account of why the double cut-
off has opened the door for extraordinarily successful physico-mathematical theories. 
After all, the success of modern mathematical physics as a whole is something real 
and therefore true. In other words: the internal reform of physics that avoids the double 
cut-off, must nevertheless show the reason of its success. The second requirement, of 
course, is the derivation of physico-mathematical theories from experience of the very 
same material things these theories are referring to.
This makes it clear again that the removal of the double cut-off cannot possibly 
be headed to eliminate mathematics from physics, but to search for its real location. 
In any case, mathematical theories in physics are not something fundamental, but 
something that needs a foundation. Nevertheless, in this task even the existing physico-
mathematical theories might have a role. Even though they are not part of the foundation 
of mathematics in physics, they most probably are heuristically useful.
Precisely the fundamental role of experience in the second requirement for an 
internal reform of physics makes such a reform, from the very outset, an outsider of 
current philosophy of physics. For the prevailing opinion is that every experience is 
theory-laden, which in turn is related to the view that experience has little or no cognitive 
value.
For instance, some programmatic words by Karl Popper might be mentioned: 
“Even the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by 
ideas: experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not 
stumble upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, we 
have to be active: we have to ‘make’ our experiences. It is we who always formulate the 
questions to be put to nature; it is we who try again and again to put these questions so 
as to elicit a clear-cut ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (for nature does not give an answer unless pressed 
for it). And in the end, it is again we who give the answer; it is we ourselves who, after 
severe scrutiny, decide upon the answer to the question we put to nature”16.
All this shows that an internal reform of physics of the kind sketched in the preceding 
paragraphs must yield very strong results indeed, if it is to be considered reasonable. The 
work to be done requires a radical reversal of the present mindset of physicists, that is 
to say, first experience unladen by theories; then theories. There are hardly any reasons 
a priori that such an attempt will succeed, except a strong confidence that ordinary 
experience tells much more than expected.
16 Popper, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Hutchinson & Co., 1959 (1st edition), London: 
Routledge, 2002, nr. 85. Italics by Popper. This number is the last subchapter of the book and, therefore, 
serves as an epilogue.
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4. The New rationale (i): basic insights out of experience
The previous sections II-IV have shown that the view of material nature offered by 
contemporary physics differs deeply from experienced reality, due to the double cut-off. 
If one wants to renounce the double cut-off and to attempt a new rationale, the question 
arises: which knowledge of experience is to be the starting point? The pre-modern 
philosophical tradition has some contents of experience to offer, and additionally the 
certainty that these contents are not theory-laden. The results of experimental physics 
match harmoniously with these contents, except for part of the properties of elementary 
particles, which clearly presuppose a theory (currently the standard model of particle 
physics). Without pretending to be exhaustive, we mention the following contents:
(i) The plurality and diversity of material things. It is possible to distinguish 
between direct and indirect observation. There also exists a reasonable dis-
tinction between macrocosm, mesocosm and microcosm.
(ii) Every material thing is either a specimen of a species or an agglomeration or 
aggregation of such specimens. Specimens of species are independent from 
each other in the sense that the existence of one does not depend on the exis-
tence of others. They have a certain ‘life time’, which sometimes seems to be 
unlimited. In practice, the belonging of a material thing to a certain species is 
determined by specific combinations of so-called specific properties (such as 
the classical mass and charge, and then spin and others.).
 This method of classifying things used in physics can also be found elsewhere. 
It does not present any reason why precisely these specific properties and not 
others are grouped together. This remains an important open question.
(iii) Every material thing exerts a dynamic influence on others and is influenced 
by others (activity, passivity).
(i), (ii) and (iii) are contents that have been consolidated for a long time, also in 
experimental physics. From this the following statements emerge that are part of the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition:
(iv) The pair of the concepts ‘specimen-species’ refers to two real aspects of any 
single material thing: this material thing ‘as something individual – as so-
mething non-individual’. Both aspects are inseparably united: a non-indivi-
dualised species never has been observed, as well as never has been observed 
an individual that has absolutely nothing in common with other individuals. 
The philosophical evaluation of this complex of experiences is known as hy-
lomorphism.
(v) Additionally, every specimen is a structure composed of two kinds of reality: 
namely as one ‘independent reality’ with ‘dependent realities’ or ‘properties’. 
The properties are dependent from an independent reality. The classical names 
for these two kinds of reality are ‘substance’ (independent) and ‘accidents’ 
(dependent). For instance, the properties called ‘energy’, ‘momentum’, ‘mass’ 
and ‘electrical charge’ are dependent realities.
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(vi) Also activity and passivity are dependent realities. It is a material thing that is 
active, i.e. exercises an impact on others. Likewise it is a material thing that is 
passive, i.e. receives an impact from others. There is no independent or ‘pure’ 
activity or passivity.
(vii) In the practice of experimental physics, the dynamic behaviour of a material 
thing gives rise to its classification by means of a specific combination of cer-
tain specific properies. The words ‘give rise’ reflect a complex of experiences 
by which the physicist perceives the link of a certain dynamic behaviour to what 
the thing is – a specimen of a species. Instead of a link, one could also speak of 
a sort of proportionality of dynamics to what the thing (permanently) is.
The de facto existing insight that material things are specimens of a species and that 
a thing’s permanent constitution and its dynamics are not identical, and the subsequent 
insight in the mediating role of dynamics is used by all physicists without exception. 
Physics depends vitally on it, even though physicists might have quite different views of 
what they de facto are doing.
Summing up it can be said that the new rationale for obtaining physico-mathematical 
theories from experience unladen by theories has a solid starting point in ordinary 
experience enriched by macroscopic experience in contemporary experimental physics. 
In traditional philosophical terms, one can speak of hylomorphism and of the activity 
and passivity of hylomorphically constituted material things.
5. The New rationale (ii): container space versus positional quality
It has been left open, in the preceding section, whether space and time are – so 
to speak – independent containers of material things or realities dependent on these 
same material things. In the former case, the hylomorphic structure must be attributed 
to material things together with their containers called space and time. In that case, it 
is not clear, whether the hylomorphic structure could be attributed to material things 
alone. But in the case that material things ‘carry’ or ‘generate’ their own space and time, 
hylomorphism obviously refers exclusively to every single material thing. Here is a 
pertinent classification made by Einstein:
“[These two] concepts of space may be contrasted as follows: (a) space as positional 
quality of the material objects; (b) space as container of all material objects. In case 
(a), space without material object is inconceivable, in case (b), a material object can 
only be conceived as existing in space; space then appears as a reality which is in 
a certain sense superior to the material world. The concept of space includes two 
classes. ”17.
Apparently, this classification has never been seriously explored. One reason for 
this might be that the alternative ‘space as a container’ has been rather successful so 
far. This holds also for the theory of general relativity, which might be interpreted 
17 Jammer, M. Concepts of Space. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993 (3rd edition), p. XV.
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in the sense that space is influenced by the things contained in it. Additionally, the 
container space is one for any number of things contained in it, while space conceived as 
a positional quality of individual things has as many contributions as there are material 
things. Obviously, the latter causes the impression to be much more complicated than 
the former.
However, there are good reasons in favour of the idea that space is a positional 
quality of material things. The first argument is negative: to date there has never been 
reported an observation of a container-space. If we assume hypothetically the existence 
of a container-space that cannot be observed, then the question arises of what is the 
relationship between such a container-space and the ‘normal’ material things that can be 
manifestly observed.
The second argument is positive and stems from the exceptionless common 
observation that different material things are in relation to each other. Accordingly, 
material things are not equally everywhere. In other words, a material thing has a 
preferred position with respect to all other things. As a positional quality is a quality of 
a material thing, the preferred position of that material thing relative to others can only 
stem from their interaction. The mutual distinction of material things relative to each 
other harmonises more with a spatial order based on a positional quality of material 
things than with a container space.
The fact that the interaction of material things is uninterrupted, can be inductively 
derived from the common experience that – first – macroscopic things have a rather 
unequivocal though variable position in relation to one another. Second, macroscopic 
things are accumulations of microscopic things. Therefore, accumulations of 
microscopic things are uninterruptedly in a preferred though variable position to all 
other accumulations of microscopic things. This indicates – third – that their respective 
microscopic components have an uninterrupted and possibly variable positional 
relationship towards one another.
Therefore – fourth – all microscopic things interact uninterruptedly and pairwise. 
This inductive insight is opposed to the first phase of the double cut-off, i.e. the division 
into domains with interaction and others without interaction. It also severely challenges 
the concept of inertia and with it the whole conceptual framework of Newtonian physics.
These reasons taken altogether make us adopt the concept of space as a positional 
quality of material things. Thus, hylomorphism refers to individual microscopic material 
things alone.
6.  The New rationale (iii): the link between specific properties  
and hylomorphic structure
The criticism of the two cut-off’s, the putting in quarantine of all known physico-
mathematical theories and the exclusive relying on theory-unladen experience 
apparently have led us away from the initial problem of the search of an organic union 
between the two bodies of knowledge. But perhaps it is more appropriate to say that 
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the clear separation of these two bodies is the first step of the problem’s solution. But 
nevertheless, there is much to do. We are still concerned with the beginnings of reflection 
upon the mentioned experiences (section V, (i)-(vii)). In this section we look at the ways 
of defining a species used in experimental physics and in the frame of hylomorphism.
The recognition of elementary particles as specimens of certain species is a great 
achievement of experimental physics, because it presents a sort of foundation or starting 
point. Specific properties have been crucial in the discovery of every species. As has been 
sketched in section V, essential for this discovery is the recognition of single specific 
properties as such and their specific and invariable combination as such. In practice, the 
experimental definition and measurement of single specific properties is performed by 
using mathematical tools. Nevertheless, for the time being we take it for granted that 
experience is not only necessary, but decisive for discovering the combination of specific 
properties. But physics does neither account for why there are specific properties at all 
(e.g. spin, mass and charge and other properties (cf. section V(ii))18 and why they are 
invariably combined in certain ways.
On the other hand, hylomorphism yields a different picture of what a species is. In 
a nutshell, Aristotelian hylomorphism is a way of saying (i) what a material thing is and 
(ii) what is its dynamic behaviour: a specimen – a member of a species – is at the same 
time both ‘a representative of a particular species’ and ‘this particular representative of 
a particular species’. The specimen inasmuch it is a species is called substantial form, 
and inasmuch it is this and no other particular representative, it is called prime matter. 
At the same time, prime matter is also the element of continuity in changes, where 
the specimen of one species disappears and other specimen of (possibly other) species 
appear: the so-called substantial changes.
The terminological shift from ‘thing as species’ and ‘thing as individual’ to ‘form’ 
and ‘matter’ stresses the distinction of two groups of aspects: those belonging exclusively 
to that particular specimen of a particular species from those belonging equally to all 
specimens of that particular species. The former group goes back to a principle called 
prime matter, and the latter goes back to a principle called form. Every specimen is both 
substantial form and prime matter. Therefore, form and matter are not things that are 
independent from each other. They are often called ‘co-principles’ of the specimen.
It may be recalled that the hylomorphic approach differs from, though relates to the 
logical definition of a species. The latter consists in singling out certain individuals of 
a larger manifold of individuals (genus) by means of a specific difference (differentia 
specifica). Nevertheless, there is certain parallelism between form and differentia 
specifica, on the one hand, and prime matter and genus, on the other. In a colloquial 
way of speaking, one could say that the more different sorts a genus contains, the more 
18 Since the general acknowledgement of the standard model of elementary particle physics in the 1970’s, the 
classification of particles is performed in two joint ways: on the one hand quarks, leptons and so-called gauge 
bosons, which are characterised by the specific properties mass, charge and spin, and on the other hand all 
other particles which are considered as certain compounds of the former. These compounds also give rise to 
specific properties. The internationally acknowledged source is the Particle Data Group, http://pdg.lbl.gov/. 
More information can be easily obtained on the internet by using the following search words ‘standard model 
of particle physics’, ‘classification of elementary particles’ etc.
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it ‘approaches’ prime matter. In the same measure the differentia specifica takes over 
more and more determinations and ‘approaches’ the substantial form.
The way of defining a species by a certain bundle of specific properties suggests 
the question whether hylomorphism is capable of yielding a rationale for why there are 
specific properties at all why they are invariably combined in certain ways. In that case, 
hylomorphism would give insight into the real structure of material things, whereas 
to date physicists have composed specific properties only mentally to a bundle. Even 
though this is not yet an extraction of anything mathematical from experienced reality, 
the real infrastructure of the hylomorphic structure of a particle instead of a mental 
combination of specific properties would be a ‘condition of possibility’ of extracting 
something from experience.
In this context, the concept of metaphysical degrees might prove capable of being 
developed. It is used by St. Thomas in the context of understanding the composition 
of form and matter as a co-implication. One of the many pertinent formulations seems 
to be particularly suggestive, because it exhibits explicitly the unity of substantial 
form: “Quodammodo una et eadem forma, secundum quod constituit materiam in actu 
inferiores gradus, est media inter materiam et seipsam, secundum quod constituit eam 
in actu superioris gradus.”19
Let us finally take a look at the thoroughly dynamic character of our material 
world. The experiments with elementary particles offer abundant evidence that their 
specific properties are linked to the dynamic processes they undergo. In other words, 
the classification of particles by their specific properties expresses a link between what 
a particle is and the way it behaves in dynamic processes. The key role of dynamics 
suggests looking at the thomistic version of hylomorphism. While the Aristotelian view 
of hylomorphism is limited to the act-potency structure of form-matter, the thomistic 
view has hylomorphism as the potency that receives the act of being so that both 
constitute the real particular specimen of a particular species. This in turn furnishes 
a connection to the principle ‘agere sequitur esse’. This principle expresses the link 
between the act of being proper to a particular thing in virtue of its essence, on the one 
hand, and the dynamics exercised by this same thing, on the other. This in turn means 
that the essence does not only “measure” the act of being of the thing in question, but 
also its dynamics.
In the case of a hylomorphically structured thing, the principle ‘agere sequitur esse’ 
yields thus a ‘hylomorphically structured’ dynamics, i.e. activity and passivity. While 
activity follows (sequitur) the substantial form, passivity follows the prime matter of 
the thing in question. And while a thing exercises its activity upon other things (without 
selfinteraction), by its passivity it receives the activity of other things. The dynamic 
outreach of a thing to other things by means of its activity and their passivity (and 
vice versa) can be expected to be a powerful foundation of a dynamic order. This can 
be more suspected than seen by taking into account that the form, by itself, has no 
19 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a.9, c, in: Thomas de Aquino, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII P.M. edita. Roma – Paris: Commissio Leonina – Editions Cerf, t. 24/1, 1996.
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individual particularities. Therefore, the mutual interaction of any two specimens of 
the same species is symmetric. Not in the sense that both actions have equal measures, 
but rather that both actions are a foundation of commensurability. This in turn might be 
expected to yield what could be called universal laws of nature in a more comprehensive 
sense. In contrast to the purely mathematical laws of nature known in contemporary 
theoretical physics, these universal laws of nature in a more comprehensive sense 
incorporate perfectly the individuality of those things the dynamic behaviour of which 
they refer to.
In this way, hylomorphism together with ‘agere sequitur esse’ might be expected 
to remedy the basic calamity of mathematical physics: material things would not follow 
or obey the laws of nature as something extrinsic, like a car ‘obediently’ follows a road. 
Rather they generate their own laws of nature, notwithstanding the importance of the 
human researcher in discovering and formulating those laws of nature. In other words, 
the laws of nature stem precisely from the things which they refer to, and therefore 
it is the things that disclose some information about themselves. The principle ‘agere 
sequitur esse‘ would thus be the basis that dynamics and therefore laws of nature are 
integrated into the thinking about things. It would be a further question whether and 
how mathematical laws of nature could be extracted from those more comprehensive 
laws of nature.
The work programme sketched in the preceding paragraphs and sections starts from 
unmodified experience and thus avoids deformations of the experienced reality from the 
very outset. While thomistic hylomorphism alone can be expected to provide insight 
into the way how the specific properties of a single material thing exhibit themselves 
as parts of a unique design, its combination with the principle ‘agere sequitur esse’ 
can be expected to yield insights about a collective dynamic order. This is innovative 
and can be expected to yield more insight into the relationship between physics and 
mathematics than the division of speculative sciences in metaphysics, mathematics and 
others proposed by Aquinas in his Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate.
7. final considerations
The discussion presented in this paper focuses on the related views of experimental 
physics and Thomistic philosophy of nature that material things are specimens of 
species or agglomerations of such specimens. This makes it attractive to search for a 
deeper connection between both. On the other hand, Thomistic philosophy of nature 
and present day theoretical physics are not so closely related. The reason for this is that 
theoretical physics is starting from mathematical laws of nature which make it difficult 
to give an account of an individual, non-exchangeable material thing’s behaviour. Its 
mindset is determined by these laws. In contrast, according to the proposal of this paper, 
Thomistic natural philosophy starts with these very same individual material things and 
strives to obtain a sort of metaphysical law of their dynamic behaviour by means of 
the principle ‘agere sequitur esse’. Its mindset is determined by these individuals. If an 
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internal reform of physics by the conceptual means of Thomistic philosophy of nature 
would really succeed, it would also include a deep change of mindset.
By its application to solving an internal problem in physics, Thomistic philosophy 
of nature does not set out to solve physical problems. It does not bring in any concepts 
alien to physics but rather helps to shape concepts within physics. In my opinion, this 
work programme is worthwhile to be carried out.
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kuo tomIStINė gamtoS fIloSofIja   
vErtINga  fIzIkaI? 
 Rudolf Larenz
Santrauka. Šiandieną nežinome, kodėl fizikoje galime remtis matematika. Gerai ži-
nomas tik tas faktas, kad ja remtis galime. Fiziką sudaro dvi žinių sritys – empirika ir 
matematika, kurios susijusios, bet nėra organiškai suaugusios. Šiame straipsnyje, pasitelkiant 
dvi kertines tomistinės gamtos filosofijos koncepcijas – hilomorfizmą ir agere sequitur esse 
principą, nurodomos priežastyss, kodėl tokių organinių sąsajų verta ieškoti.   
Eksperimentinė fizika iš esmės yra grindžiama elementariųjų dalelių egzistavimo kon-
cepcija. Tomistinė gamtos filosofija savo tyrimus pradeda nuo tų pačių labai individualių 
materialių elementų bei jų hilomorfinės struktūros, kuri nurodo materialių elementų pri-
klausomybę tam tikroms rūšims arba jų aglomeracijoms. Tad ir eksperimentinė fizika, ir 
tomistinė gamtos filosofija turi vieną požiūrį į jų tiriamą bendrą objektą.  
Kita vertus, teorinė fizika gamtos procesams aiškinti taiko matematinius dėsnius, todėl 
šie dėsniai pavadinti gamtos dėsniais. Šis taikymas lydimas išbandymų bei klaidų, jis  gali 
būti daugiau ar mažiau sėkmingas, bet visada lieka hipotetiškas. Be to, dėsniai niekada ne-
siejami su atskiru individualiu materialiu elementu, kurio elgseną jie turėtų apibrėžti.
Siekiant įžvelgti teorinės fizikos ir tomistinės gamtos filosofijos ryšį, šiame straipsnyje 
aptariami eksperimentai ir specialūs matavimai, tarpininkaujantys tarp materialaus pasau-
lio ir fizikinių-matematinių teorijų. Aiškėja, kad šis ryšis implikuoja dvi griežtas patirties 
modifikacijas: siekiant gauti rezultatus, eksperimentai atliekami baigtiniame laiko intervale, 
o jų rezultatai vienareikšmiškai priskiriami eksperimento objektui. 
Norint šių modifikacijų išvengti, vertėtų jų išvis atsisakyti. Šiame straipsnyje siūloma 
praktinė programa, kaip fizikines-matematines teorijas atskirti nuo patirtinių duomenų. 
Programos filosofinė esmė kyla iš tomistinės hilomorfizmo sampratos ir iš agere sequitur esse 
principo. Pirminės (grynos) fizikinių-matematinių teorijų formos atkūrimą siūloma pradėti 
nuo įvardintų dviejų elementų derinimo pasekmių įvertinimo. Daroma išvada, kad agere 
sequitur esse principas užtikrina metafizikos ir matematikos atskirtį. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: fizika, matematizavimas, redukcionizmas, pagrindimas, hilo-
morfizmas, agere sequitur esse.
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